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In Defense of ElitismWilliam A. Henry III Doubleday, 212 pp. $26.95 Review by Reed Woodhouse Featured in BBR January/February 1995 The man behind this deliberately provocative "defense of elitism" was a self-described "registered Democrat, a recipient of awards for civil rights writing [and] a card-carrying member of the American Civil Liberties Union"-quite as much egalitarian as elitist, in fact. But he believed that in the perpetual strife in this country between egalitarianism and elitism, the former had been "winning far too thoroughly." In his opinion, egalitarian zeal has overstepped reason in its demand for immediate equality of social outcome, rather than a slower, more achievable equality of opportunity; and in so doing has become parochial, even paranoid. Egalitarians have made a radical and irresponsible jump: if various disadvantaged groups are not "proportionally" represented among the American elites, then elitism itself must go. There must be no more invidious distinctions among good, better and best, whether among people or thoughts or cultures, whether in the present or even in the past. Reason itself must yield to "nonrationalistic forms of knowledge" (as one radical TLS writer put it). Standards of evidence and proof are not necessary for the melanin theory of black culture, by which the molecule responsible for blacks' skin pigmentation is held to be a mystical source of energy and intelligence. Traditions of taste must be not only questioned but dismissed in order to achieve in art the "proportional representation" we now demand in government. Consequently, a second-rate author like Aphra Behn must be talked of as if she were fully equivalent in achievement to Dryden. The goal of education must be self-esteem rather than self-knowledge. And the general theory behind this dismantling of excellence seems to be (as Henry puts it) "If one can't win, then one changes the rules." In Defense of Elitism, then, is not a defense of any particular elite but of the idea of excellence, which Henry feels is being abandoned. Henry turns out to be in fact an old-fashioned meritocrat, combining a liberal's belief in the career open to talent (no matter whose) and the conservative's in the individual nature of talent. In Henry's blunt phrasing: "Some people are better than others-smarter, harder working, more learned, more productive, harder to replace." And these people are the ones who must be recognized, encouraged, and trained for positions of leadership in our society from an early age. Not to do so would be imprudent for society, and unjust to the talented. He is therefore a predictable and funny foe of the movement to stop ability tracking in public schools (the "theory" of this movement is that "bright children ought to be helping slow ones rather than maximizing their own achievements and pulling ahead.") He notes a similar movement in games, whereby "an elementary school class is apt to be divided into so many teams that no one is the last chosen. Children are thus supposedly shielded from noticing who is better or worse."
Harder to swallow, and certainly harder to prove, is Henry's assertion that some cultures are better than others. (Better for whom, is the immediate question.) He lists seven criteria by which to judge the comparative superiority of a culture: social liberty, relative freedom from want, modernity in science, permanent art objects appreciated by other cultures than one's own, widespread education, cultural expansionism and hierarchical organization. As he must have been well aware, each of these criteria demands searching definition and awareness of contrary views, neither of which Henry has the space or ability to offer. The world-view that underlies his preferences-for they are not yet principles-is a late version of the Whig view of history: rational, progressive, commonsensical. (Even more Whiggish is his eighth, uninsisted-on criterion, freedom from theocracy.) But one need not be a woozy relativist to see that, admirable as these criteria are, they seem to leave out as much excellence as they include. Take a quality as hopelessly indefinable as the "douceur de vivre" which a dispossessed French aristocrat found in socially-rigid pre-Revolutionary France, or that spirit of unjudgmental, unambitious "love" which Luciano De Crescenzo finds in the utterly desperate slums of Naples. While no one would want to construct a polity based on the douceur de vivre or on love, they are sometimes by-products of quite "inferior" polities, and seem arguably a human achievement as great in its way as that of putting men on the moon. I'm not sure Henry could account for excellence that was not expressed as worldly success. Reed Woodhouse is a Contributing Editor of the Boston Book Review. ©1995. Boston Book Review. All rights reserved. |
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