Liberty, Justice and the State

Politics could be described as a kind of bartering that enables us to overcome the discontinuities in our lives by resolving conflicts in a peaceful rather than unruly manner, and seeking a sphere in which there is some common or general accord. It is thus the art of compromise, conciliation, and negotiation rather than brute or naked force where it concerns meaningful and effective decision-making. It is also an attempt to establish some legitimate authority in response to the...
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Politics could be described as a kind of bartering that enables us to overcome the discontinuities in our lives by resolving conflicts in a peaceful rather than unruly manner, and seeking a sphere in which there is some common or general accord. It is thus the art of compromise, conciliation, and negotiation rather than brute or naked force where it concerns meaningful and effective decision-making. It is also an attempt to establish some legitimate authority in response to the different needs that arise in society, and create a system of benefits and burdens that are binding on all. To this extent it is about the means and not the end, or at least the sufficiency of any means as opposed to the morality of any end. How to achieve what is good is thus to achieve what is useful, or at least the best strategy or plan that suits the circumstance at hand. In this case we do not say that if the end is right or wrong then the means are value-free, but that since the means are value-laden then the end is value-free. Given that wielding a blunt instrument to achieve a result is neither ethical nor unethical, the best we can hope for is a more ethical approach to the fashioning of any singular or conjugate set of means. So it is with our diplomats in their global dealings and our policy makers in the world of home affairs. There is another view however that suggests that the difference between the political and the non-political hinges on the distinction between a ''public'' and a ''private'' life, with the assumption that what is true of the one must also be true of the other. That is, that politics is an ethical activity that replaces right behaviour with just behaviour; that it is the pursuit of human betterment through ostensibly public means just as ethics is the pursuit of human betterment through ostensibly private means. In answer to the question where this line should be drawn the most common response is between civil society and that entity we call ''the state''. State institutions such as the government, the judiciary and the armed forces could be regarded as public because they touch all aspects of communal life. On the other hand, institutions such as the family, business conglomerates, trade unions and divers clubs could be regarded as private because they support only limited aims and are voluntary to join as well as voluntary to quit.(Although of course, not voluntary to join in the case of the family). This may also generate a particular perception of public life as being good in one sense but bad in another. Participation in the activities of the state may be deemed worthwhile if this is seen to involve interaction amongst individuals who are both free and equal in their regard for one another. On the other hand, state participation may be seen in a negative light if this limits the range of our choices, especially if it interferes with family commitments and everyday leisure pursuits. But if politics is concerned principally with questions about ''the state'' a related question concerns its origin, whether it has evolved naturally or whether it is a purely human artifice borne of certain indispensable needs. This controversy has a long history dating back to the Greeks, and Aristotle''s is typical of the kind of approach that supports the former. Political associations are regarded as ''natural'' progressions starting with those that are simple and working towards those that are more complex. The pairing of a male and a female is essential for the sake of procreation, and that introduces the basic unit of the family. The pairing of a master and a slave is essential for the sake of rulership, and that introduces the primacy of mental agility over physical strength. What we mean by the head of any household is then extended to the head of any village, although in this case the lord or master acquires a certain status which demands the strict loyalty of his subjects. A convening of several villages is then the basis for that association which we have ultimately come to know as the state. On the question of an artifice or convention there are various ways this may be handled, but let us suppose it concerns the actual condition that men might be in at any time. In the account that Hume provides, justice is not something ''natural'' in the sense of something inveterate but something that may be rendered useless when certain circumstances or conditions have been met. If for instance nature is bountiful in the supply of goods, then this will cause men to be more generous and humane in their dealings with one another. On the other hand if nature is niggardly in the supply of goods, then this will cause men to be more selfish and ill-disposed in their dealings with one another. However in the more usual circumstance where there is a degree of sufficiency rather than insufficiency, men will judge it in their ''best interest'' to regulate their desires, to partition their goods, to enjoy the benefits of what they have sought and laboured for. In other words, justice is somewhere between generosity and selfishness where it concerns a sentiment, and abundance and scarcity where it concerns an endowment. To treat of an artifice or convention in these terms however is not exactly what we mean by the striking of any contract, since that assumes some original condition or a ''state of nature'' from which men might wish to be freed. In his timeless classic "Leviathan" Hobbes postulates such a state, or some impoverished condition in which the lives of men are ''solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short''. There are several points that need to be made about this alleged ''state of nature'' or a primitive condition prior to the advent of civilized society. Firstly, it was not Hobbes intention to give an accurate description of any actual condition in the way that an anthropologist might - this was merely a working hypothesis that suited his particular ends. In contrast to what Aristotle takes to be a natural development, Hobbes argues that men must free themselves from their baser instincts if they are to achieve a more '' harmonious'' and ''peaceful'' state of coexistence. In fact if one were to speculate on a possible ''state of nature'' then this would probably be more in keeping with the way that Locke regards the matter. At a time when men lived by hunting and gathering, there would have been no general scarcity and hence no need to reign in or regulate their desires. Such a situation would not have made them selfish it would simple have made them less mindful of any competing claims. In others words it would have made them neither selfish nor unselfish, since where there is no basis for a division of goods neither is there for the sentiment of greed or generosity. Claims would only become necessary when needs increased and resources dwindled to the point where no man was sure he could retain those possessions he had acquired through his industry. Thus from an historical point of view it appears that Locke may have been a good deal closer to the mark. Another point that needs to be made about a contract theory of government is that it is rather an idealized account of the way that power is actually wielded in everyday life, and certainly not a reflection of the way that different states or territories are in fact related to one another. In "The Prince'' Machiavelli takes an entirely different approach, since to seize and retain a principality requires not trust but careful machinations, guile, and a degree of brute strength. However we also need to be clear about the difference between a contract or a promise when this is demanded of a person and a contract or a promise when this is freely afforded by a person. When Machiavelli suggests that a ruler neither ''can nor ought to keep his word when this is hurtful to him'' this is not prudent or practical advice but rather immoral and unconscionable no matter what the tim