Strategic Social Choice: Stable Representations of Constitutions |
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Series title: | Studies in Choice and Welfare Ser. |
ISBN: | 978-1-282-92547-2 |
Publication Date: | Jan 2011 |
Publisher: | Springer
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Book Format: | Ebook |
List Price: | USD $238.00 |
Book Description:
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This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.
This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.