Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules |
|
| Author:
| Gehrlein, William V.
Lepelley, Dominique |
| Series title: | Studies in Choice and Welfare Ser. |
| ISBN: | 978-3-642-03107-6 |
| Publication Date: | Nov 2010 |
| Publisher: | Springer
|
| Book Format: | Ebook |
| List Price: | USD $179.00 |
Book Description:
|
This book argues that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters' preferences become more mutually coherent. It also focuses on the Condorcet Criterion, which states that pairwise majority rule winner should be chosen as the election winner.
This book argues that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters' preferences become more mutually coherent. It also focuses on the Condorcet Criterion, which states that pairwise majority rule winner should be chosen as the election winner.