Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics The Myth of Neutrality |
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Author:
| Adolph, Christopher |
Series title: | Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics Ser. |
ISBN: | 978-1-139-50676-2 |
Publication Date: | Apr 2013 |
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press
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Book Format: | Digital (delivered electronically) |
List Price: | AUD $200.00 |
Book Description:
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Economists emphasize the role central banks' independence plays in achieving good economic outcomes. Using game theory and data from dozens of countries, Adolph illustrates that central bankers with different career trajectories choose different monetary policies. Central banks run by former bankers favor low inflation, whereas bureaucrats support low unemployment.
Economists emphasize the role central banks' independence plays in achieving good economic outcomes. Using game theory and data from dozens of countries, Adolph illustrates that central bankers with different career trajectories choose different monetary policies. Central banks run by former bankers favor low inflation, whereas bureaucrats support low unemployment.