Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism The Puzzle of Distributive Politics |
|
Author:
| Stokes, Susan C. Dunning, Thad Nazareno, Marcelo Brusco, Valeria |
Series title: | Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics Ser. |
ISBN: | 978-1-107-32490-9 |
Publication Date: | Jun 2014 |
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press
|
Book Format: | Digital download and online |
List Price: | USD $225.00 |
Book Description:
|
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism studies distributive politics: how parties and governments use material resources to win elections. The authors develop a theory that explains why loyal supporters, rather than swing voters, tend to benefit from pork-barrel politics; why poverty encourages clientelism and vote buying; and why redistribution and voter participation do not justify non-programmatic distribution.
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism studies distributive politics: how parties and governments use material resources to win elections. The authors develop a theory that explains why loyal supporters, rather than swing voters, tend to benefit from pork-barrel politics; why poverty encourages clientelism and vote buying; and why redistribution and voter participation do not justify non-programmatic distribution.