Death and Taxes |
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Author:
| Weisinger, Jordan |
ISBN: | 978-1-0791-3509-1 |
Publication Date: | Jul 2019 |
Publisher: | Independently Published
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Book Format: | Paperback |
List Price: | USD $13.99 |
Book Description:
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The smell of rebellion is in the air. Not only does the United States suffer from rampant wealth inequality but it is in middle of historic demographic shift, where for the first time ever, a democracy will transfer majority political power from one demographic group to another. Most demographic shifts have resulted in pogroms or genocide, and the United States is presenting the telltale signs for the same risks. The nation is acquiring significant amounts of debt due to a relentless...
More DescriptionThe smell of rebellion is in the air. Not only does the United States suffer from rampant wealth inequality but it is in middle of historic demographic shift, where for the first time ever, a democracy will transfer majority political power from one demographic group to another. Most demographic shifts have resulted in pogroms or genocide, and the United States is presenting the telltale signs for the same risks. The nation is acquiring significant amounts of debt due to a relentless defunding of the federal government, and suffers almost yearly government shutdowns and debt default threats. As the number of insults increase, so does the likelihood of an event. Government shutdowns pose the most significant risk to democratic governments for three reasons. First, they are the most effective method to divert funds away from the federal government back to the state governments. Second, they prime the electorate to support the rebellion by coercing them into public commitments of support. Public declarations of support make the rebellion far more effective than any secretive coups or spur of the moment movement. Third, when rebellions are fomented on due process, it limits the options another party has to counteract it. On the surface, the rhetoric and policies are legitimate and serves the interests of their constituencies, preventing law enforcement agencies from preventing or prosecuting offenders. Without historical references, this strategy for rebellion is less recognizable and nearly impossible to dispel or prevent. Government shutdowns are one of the more serious insults a nation can suffer. Although most are short in duration, there is the possibility that it extends until new elections are held several years later. If the shutdown occurs immediately following an election, this could be a period of two-years or more. There is the expectation that the politicians will price the likelihood of winning subsequent elections into their determination to keep the government shutdown. The longer a government remains shut down by a party, the more likely they are to lose the next election. However, if the party has already determined to use this opportunity to organize a rebellion, they will care less about losing the next election cycle and the two-year delay between elections presents the best opportunity to mobilize the states in open revolt. State controlled National Guard armies and local police forces may be enough to overwhelm a federal government that has run out of cash and the borrowing authority. War efforts costs substantial amounts of money and the rebellious states have the advantage if the government remains shutdown for one or two years before the next elections. Tax-based systems of representation make democratic nations less susceptible to the threat of government shutdown and debt defaults by allocating more political representation to the states paying more federal taxes. This has two significant effects. The more populous and wealthier states generally prefer progressive taxes and this should result in lower deficits. Threats to shut down the government or default of its debt are less legitimate when the government takes on less accumulated debt and maintains smaller deficits. The states that generally pursue austerity measures and pursue government shutdowns most often will have significantly less representation in at least one of the legislature's chambers. This will reduce the number of attempts and seriously curtail the support for these dangerous policies. The combination of these two properties in tax-based representation will make nations more likely to survive into maturity, where higher per capita incomes and stronger labor rights, make the population far less susceptible to a culture of government shutdowns and debt default threats.