Normativity

The normative judgments we make are divided into two groups: evaluative judgments, such as that a product or a person is good; and directive judgments, such as that a toaster should toast bread safely and well, or that we owe each other ethical treatment. InNormativity,a new entry in the reputablePaul Carus Lecturesseries, Judith Jarvis Thomson explores how these two kinds of judgments interconnect, and what makes them true when they are true. Writing in a clear, accessible style,...
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The normative judgments we make are divided into two groups: evaluative judgments, such as that a product or a person is good; and directive judgments, such as that a toaster should toast bread safely and well, or that we owe each other ethical treatment. InNormativity,a new entry in the reputablePaul Carus Lecturesseries, Judith Jarvis Thomson explores how these two kinds of judgments interconnect, and what makes them true when they are true. Writing in a clear, accessible style, Thomson argues persuasively that normativity is not limited to the moral. We can learn about the justification of moral judgments in particular, she says, by looking into the sources of normativity in general. The idea that there is an unbridgeable gap between the moral and the factual has hobbled moral theorizing in the past; this provocative study of normativity in general shows why there is no such gap, and what that means.