Robust Mechanism Design; the Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs |
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| Author:
| Bergemann, Dirk
Morris, Stephen |
| Series title: | World Scientific Series in Economic Theory Ser. |
| ISBN: | 978-1-280-66979-8 |
| Publication Date: | Jan 2012 |
| Publisher: | World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd
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| Book Format: | Ebook |
| List Price: | USD $220.00 |
Book Description:
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Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)
This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.
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More DescriptionForeword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)
This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.
The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Sample Chapter(s)
Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007) (33 KB)
Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction (252 KB)
Chapter 12: Robust Monopoly Pricing (174 KB)
Introductory slides
Contents: Robust Mechanism DesignEx Post ImplementationRobust Implementation in Direct MechanismsRobust Implementation in General MechanismsThe Role of the Common Prior in Robust ImplementationAn Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic UncertaintyRobust Virtual ImplementationMultidimensional Private Value AuctionsThe Robustness of Robust ImplementationRationalizable ImplementationPricing without PriorsRobust Monopoly Pricing
Readership: Graduate students and researchers who are interested in Economic Theory.