US Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947

The publication of The 9/11 Commission Report, the war in Iraq, and subsequent negotiation of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 have provoked the most intense debate over the future of American intelligence since the end of World War II. For observers of this national discussion-as well as of future debates that are all but inevitable-this paper offers a historical perspective on reform studies and proposals that have appeared over the course of the US...
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The publication of The 9/11 Commission Report, the war in Iraq, and subsequent negotiation of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 have provoked the most intense debate over the future of American intelligence since the end of World War II. For observers of this national discussion-as well as of future debates that are all but inevitable-this paper offers a historical perspective on reform studies and proposals that have appeared over the course of the US Intelligence Community's evolution into its present form. We have examined the origins, context, and results of 14 significant official studies that have surveyed the American intelligence system since 1947. We explore the reasons these studies were launched, the recommendations they made, and the principal results that they achieved. It should surprise no one that many of the issues involved-such as the institutional relationships between military and civilian intelligence leaders-remain controversial to the present time. For this reason, we have tried both to clarify the perennial issues that arise in intelligence reform efforts and to determine those factors that favor or frustrate their resolution. Of the 14 reform surveys we examined, only the following achieved substantial success in promoting the changes they proposed: the Dulles Report (1949), the Schlesinger Report (1971), the Church Committee Report (1976), and the 9/11 Commission Report (2004). Having examined these and other surveys of the Intelligence Community, we recognize that much of the change since 1947 has been more ad hoc than systematically planned. Our investigation indicates that to bring about significant change, a study commission has had to get two things right: process and substance. Two studies that had large and comparatively rapid effects-the 1949 Dulles Report and the 1971 Schlesinger Report-were both sponsored by the National Security Council. The 9/11 Commission, with its public hearings in the midst of an election season, had even more impact, while the Church Committee's effects were indirect but eventually powerful. It's perhaps worth noting that a study commission whose chairman later became DCI, as in the case of Allen Dulles and James Schlesinger, is also likely to have a lasting influence. Finally, studies conducted on the eve of or during a war, or in a war's immediate aftermath, are more likely to lead to change. The 1947 National Security Act drew lessons from World War II, and it was the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 that brought about the intelligence reforms the Dulles Report had proposed over a year earlier. The 1971 Schlesinger Report responded to President Nixon's need to cut spending as he extracted the United States from the Vietnam War. The breakdown of the Cold War defense and foreign policy consensus during the Vietnam War set the scene for the Church Committee's investigations during 1975-76, but the fact that US troops were not in combat at the time certainly diminished the influence of its conclusions. In contrast, the 9/11 Commission Report was published at the height of a national debate over the War on Terror and the operations in Iraq, which magnified its salience. Finally, in the substance of these reports, one large trend is evident over the years. Studies whose recommendations have caused power in the Intelligence Community to gravitate toward either the Director of Central Intelligence or the Office of the Secretary of Defense-or both-have generally had the most influence. This pattern of increasing concentration of intelligence power in the DCI and Secretary of Defense endured from the 1940s through the 1990s, whether Democrats or Republicans controlled the White House or Congress. When a new pattern of influence and cooperation forms, we are confident that future reform surveys will not hesitate to propose ways to improve it.