Veto Bargaining Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power |
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| Author:
| Cameron, Charles M. |
| Contribution by:
| Calvert, Randall
Eggertsson, Thrainn |
| Series title: | Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Ser. |
| ISBN: | 978-0-521-62550-0 |
| Publication Date: | Jun 2000 |
| Publisher: | Cambridge University Press
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| Book Format: | Paperback |
| List Price: | USD $34.99 |
Book Description:
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Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution.
Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution.